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ABSTRACT
With a rapidly increasing market of millions of devices, the intelli-
gent virtual assistants (IVA) have become a new vector available to
exploit security breaches. In this work we approach the third revi-
sion of the Amazon Echo ecosystem’s device Alexa from a security
perspective, focusing our efforts on the interaction between the
user and the device. We found the client-server communications to
be robust using encryption, but studying the voice message recog-
nition system we discovered a method to execute voice commands
remotely, a feature not available by default. This method could be
used against the user if an attacker manages to perform a session
hijacking attack on the web or mobile clients.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the advance in speech recognition techniques as well as the
massive amounts of data that can be currently analyzed using artifi-
cial intelligence algorithms and cloud computing, a new device not
present some years ago is increasingly getting relevance in com-
puter interaction. Intelligent virtual assistants (IVA) like Amazon
Echo or Google Home are gaining market rapidly due to the ability
of performing simple tasks using only voice interaction. This can
be considered the next step in human-machine interaction but at
the same time it can be observed as a security and privacy threat.
Prior studies already demonstrated some vulnerabilities that
most voice-recognition devices suffer. For instance, Carlini et al. in
[2] and Zhang et al. in [11] studied how to produce voice commands
using sounds innaudible by humans that are properly recognized
by the devices.
In this work we dissect and analyze the communications between
Amazon’s third revision of Alexa Echo devices, Amazon servers, and
computer and mobile phone clients. On top of that, we also study
the voice command interaction system. Based on our findings we
show a way to exploit the device capabilities to be able to execute
commands remotely sending reminders that will be self-executed,
a feature that can be used against the user.
2 SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
As a cloud based service, Alexa makes use of big data and cloud
computing systems to listen, interpret and execute a list of pre-
defined voice commands available. All the ecosystem has several
security implications; recognition security (voice commands), cloud
security (Amazon servers), skills (Alexa’s own applications), proto-
cols (bluetooth, wifi) and client security (website and mobile phone
applications). Some of them like skills security has already been in-
vestigated in the past [4] while some others like protocols security
is dependent on very specific flaws [1] already covered. Our work
focuses mainly on the interaction security, containing both, client
security and voice recognition security.
2.1 Client security
In order to study the client communication security, first we ana-
lyzed the servers and services being accessed by Alexa on a daily
basis. Figure 1 shows the device communications diagram when it
is turned on. The starting one is fireoscaptiveportal.com and the next
requests are performed clockwise. Whenever possible we analyzed
the data being sent and received to try to infer the function of each
one of the servers.
For non-secure communications sent by http it is not difficult
to access the data. Apart from fireoscaptiveportal.com, portal from
MarkMonitor [5], a company focused on computer security, the rest
of the servers are accessed to check connectivity with some of their
own Amazon services or to access the media file to be reproduced
by the device.
To get information about the rest of the servers, we used the
Burp Suite tool [8] to simulate a “man in the middle” attack. This
way we can study the client-server encrypted communications. The
structure of the solution is shown in Figure 2. We were able to see
the metrics being sent to device-metrics-us.amazon.com as well as
information about different endpoints and multimedia resources
being set by arcus-uswest.amazon.com.
Figure 1: Device communications
Interestingly, we also found data about Alexa usage historic
usually unaccessible by the user. This is sensible data that can be
used to extrapolate useful patterns about the time frames when the
users are far from the device. Table 1 shows a summary of the data
that can be extracted from the communications between the server
and the dashboard. Note that the last url permits the user to set a
reminder on the device remotely, fact that will take special interest
in the next section. We have published a small tool [6] that using a
session cookie shows the usually unavailable historic data.
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Table 1: Information available inside resources
2.2 Voice interaction security
Looking that some IVAs reacted to TV commercials in the past
[3] Amazon engineers implemented an on-the-cloud system to
compare device wake voice commands with multiple other devices
in real time [7]. This way they can detect broadcasting events like
commercials.
Therefore, our research is focused on asynchronous events, like
online videos, that could send voice commands to the device. More-
over, instead of looking directly for wake words, we search for
speech recognition errors that could be used as a wake word to
send the command. A similar approach has been taken in the past
[4] to open a fake skill (Alexa’s own application) whose name is
similar in pronuntiation to a legitimate one.
To study speech recognition errors, an Spanish language au-
dio database [9] with more than 1.700 different files was repro-
duced near the device while monitoring the reaction. We found
some words that were commonly misunderstood (e.g.“el examen”,
“economía”) and made the device to wake up, listen and check with
Amazon servers, but the given commandwas discarded. That means
that Amazon also has a protection system to discard this type of
false positives.
Figure 2: Burp Suite usage diagram
Surprisingly, during our experiments we observed that the de-
vice listens to himself while reproducing a message. Thus, we setup
a reminder with a voice command inside it and let the device repro-
duce it. We discovered that if the volume setting is higher enough
the device will execute the command just after reading it and will
not be discarded.
This can be exploited in a number of different ways. For example,
if an attacker gets the user session cookie by a session hijacking
[10] attack (something plausible as we found that dashboard ses-
sion cookies renewal period is longer than a decade) an attacking
reminder can be set using the url mentioned in Section 2.1. The
reminder will be automatically executed. This permits the attacker
to do online purchases, unless the purchase verification code is
turned on, or to operate other available intelligent devices like door
locks.
3 CONCLUSION
In this work we presented a first look at Alexa’s interaction security.
We achieved some interesting findings as the remote execution of
commands using a reminder, or finding the historic data hidden in
the dashboard, that can potentially be used by an attacker against
the user. We plan to continue exploring the available possibilities
to detect new threats that could lead to new security breaches and
privacy leakages.
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